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COMMERCIAL LAW
I. COMMERCIAL DEALINGS: SECURED TRANSACTIONS AND
CONTRACT PERFORMANCE
In Barth Brothers v. Billings,' the Wisconsin Supreme
Court considered the issues of attachment and enforcement of
security interests. Commenced as a garnishment action, the
issues were raised by two impleaded defendants after
$29,308.24 had been paid into court and the garnishee defen-
dant, Farm Loan Service, Inc., was discharged from all liabil-
ity. The controversy centered on the proceeds of sale from
sixty-six cows auctioned off by the debtor's wife, with Produc-
tion Credit Association (hereinafter PCA) and Barth each as-
serting an interest therein.
PCA claimed the funds based on notes and security agree-
ments signed by the Billings over a two year period which gave
PCA security interest in property described as security
for the payment of all existing and future indebtedness of
Debtor to Secured Party, and of all renewals and extensions
thereof, and any and all additional loans and advances her-
eafter made by Secured Party to Debtor prior to the filing of
a record of Termination Statement.2
In addition to describing certain property, all of the security
agreements provided a security interest to be given in "All
property similar to that described. . . which at any time may
hereafter be acquired by the Debtor. . . .,, A financing state-
ment was filed ten days after the signing of the original security
agreement covering "All machinery, All Cattle, All Feed, All
Equipment, Auto, and Truck" and any proceeds from the col-
lateral.'
Barth based his claim to the proceeds on four notes signed
by the Billings in 1971 and 1972, each of which contained a
notation providing that it was secured by a financing statement
filed with the register of deeds. However, the boxes designating
proceeds on the financing statements were left unchecked.
These notes were taken for livestock sold to the debtor by
Barth, and three of the financing statements were filed within
1. 68 Wis. 2d 80, 227 N.W.2d 673 (1975).
2. Id. at 82, 227 N.W.2d at 675.
3. Id. at 82-83, 227 N.W.2d at 675.
4. Id. at 83, 227 N.W.2d at 675.
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ten days of the notes being signed. Prior to the auction, Barth
contacted Mrs. Billings and walked around the barn-yard iden-
tifying the cows he had sold by checking ear tag numbers.
On appeal the Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed the trial
court findings, holding that: (1) PCA had a valid perfected
security interest in the cows sold at auction and the proceeds,
(2) Barth did not have an enforceable security interest, and (3)
Barth did not have a purchase money security interest in the
cows which would give him priority over PCA's claim.
The court found that PCA had perfected its security inter-
est under sections 409.2035 and 409.2046 relating to enforceabil-
ity and attachment and section 409.302 relating to the filing of
a financing statement. The after-acquired property clause and
the future advance clause, whether or not given pursuant to
commitment, were also legally sufficient.7 Barth's argument
that section 409.204 required new value to be given was based
on section 409.108,8 but the court easily disposed of this conten-
tion by relying on the plain language of section 401.201(44),
which provides in part: "'Value.' Except as otherwise provided
• . . a person gives 'value' for rights if he acquires them: . . .
(b) As security for or in total or partial satisfaction of a pre-
existing claim." In reaching its conclusion, the court followed
the well accepted interpretation that section 409.108 was prin-
cipally important in insolvency proceedings under the Federal
5. The significant portion is § 409.203(1)(a) and (b) which read:
(1) Subject to . . . a security interest is not enforceable against the debtor or
third parties unless:
(a) The collateral is in the possession of the third party; or
(b) The debtor has signed a security agreement which contains a de-
scription of the collateral ...
§ 409.203 (1971) was amended by § 409.203 (1973) but without substantial effect to
the case at hand.
6. Wis. STAT. § 409.204(1) (1971) reads in part:
A security interest cannot attach until there is agreement (s. 401.201(3)) that it
attach and value is given and the debtor has rights in the collateral.
7. Wis. STAT. § 409.204(3) and (5) (1971) have since been amended by Wis. Laws
1973, ch. 215 but without substantial change or effect on the outcome of this case.
8. Wis. STAT. § 409.108 (1973) refers only to "new value," and reads:
Where a secured party makes an advance, incurs an obligation, releases a
perfected security interest, or otherwise gives new value which is to be secured
in whole or in part by after-acquired property his security interest in the after-
acquired collateral shall be deemed to be taken for new value and not as security
for an antecedent debt if the debtor acquires his rights in such collateral either
in the ordinary course of his business or under a contract or purchase made




Bankruptcy Act and state law wherein certain transfers for
antecedent debts are voidable as preferences.' Therefore, value
may consist in, and a security interest may be given for, a pre-
existing debt.'"
As to Barth, no security interest existed because there was
no signed security agreement. The filed notes signed by Billings
with accompanying notations that they were secured by Fi-
nancing Statements describing the collateral were held insuffi-
cient to create a valid security interest because for a security
interest to attach there must be an agreement that it attach,"
and to be enforceable against the debtor or a third party the
secured party must either have possession of the collateral or
the debtor must have signed a security agreement describing
the collateral.'2 The Wisconsin court reiterated the established
rule'3 that while it is possible for a single document to serve
both the function of a financing statement and a security agree-
ment, it is not possible for a financing statement, without a
debtor's grant of a security interest, to serve as a security agree-
ment.
Barth, in an attempt to overcome the deficient security
agreement, contended that he had taken possession of the cat-
tle. The trial court found that his acts of identification were
insufficient to constitute possession which required the une-
quivical act of taking physical control of the cattle or of segre-
gating his cattle from the others." The Wisconsin Supreme
Court concurred, noting that even if such possession had oc-
curred, it would have been irrelevant because PCA's claim had
been perfected prior to the alleged possession.
Barth's remaining theory to support a claim to the proceeds
rested on the priority given purchase money security interests
under section 409.312(4).'" However, section 409.312(4) requires
9. 3 ULA - UCC § 9-108, Comment. See also In re Platt, 257 F. Supp. 478 (E.D.
Pa. 1966).
10. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMER-
CIAL CODE (hereinafter WHITE & SUMMERS) § 23-24 (1972).
11. 68 Wis. 2d at 82, 227 N.W.2d at 675.
12. Id.
13. E.g., L. and V. Co. v. Asch, 267 Md. 251, 297 A. 2d 285 (1972); Kaiser
Aluminum and Chemical Sales, Inc. v. Hurst, 176 N.W.2d 176 (Iowa 1970).
14. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 10, at § 23-10.
15. Wis. STAT. § 409.312(4) (1971) reads:
A purchase money security interest in collateral other than inventory has prior-
ity over a conflicting interest in the same collateral if the purchase money
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that the security interest be perfected within ten days of the
debtor's receiving possession. This was clearly not complied
with.
Thus, the rule of Barth Brothers reaffirms the prevailing
view that: (1) a pre-existing debt is sufficient to constitute the
value required by section 409.204(1) for the attachment of a
security interest in after-acquired property, and (2) a financing
statement and a security agreement may be one and the same
only if the financing statement contains a grant of a security.
More importantly, however, is the court's determination that
section 409.108 does not invalidate security interest in after-
acquired property where the value given is for a pre-existing
debt.
In Toulon v. Nagle,'" section 401.110,17 a provision unique
to the commercial codes of Wisconsin and Nevada, was con-
strued for the first time.' 8 Generally, the purpose of section
401.110 is to permit transactions entered into prior to the effec-
tive date of the Uniform Commercial Code to be interpreted
and enforced under the law as written at the time the transac-
tion was made.
In 1964, Toulan and Nagle entered into an oral contract for
the purpose of obtaining an automobile franchise. Under the
terms of the initial agreement, Toulan was to contribute
$12,500 entitling him to a 25 percent interest with the under-
standing that within five years he would increase his interest
to 50 percent. After some delay, the dealership opened on Janu-
ary 4, 1967. Toulan did not have the funds required for his
investment, having exhausted his capital in living expenses in
the interim. According to the testimony of Toulan at trial,
when he told Nagle in January of 1967 that he would be unable
to make his initial investment, Nagle told him to "get it in the
sooner the better."'
9
security interest is perfected at the time the debtor receives possession of the
collateral or within 10 days thereafter.
16. 67 Wis. 2d 233, 226 N.W.2d 480 (1975).
17. Wis. STAT. § 401.110 (1973) provides in relevant part:
401.110 Effective date; provision for transition. (1) This code applies to
transactions entered into and events occurring on and after July 1, 1965.
(a) Transactions validly entered into before July 1, 1965, and the rights,
duties and interests flowing from them remain valid thereafter and may be
terminated, completed, consummated or enforced as required or permitted by
any statute amended or repealed by chapter 158, laws of 1963, as though such
repeal or amendment had not occurred.
18. 67 Wis. 2d at 250, 226 N.W.2d at 489.
19. Id. at 244, 226 N.W.2d at 486.
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In the summer of 1967, Toulan secured $5,000 and made his
first purchase. The business required increased capitalization,
which.Nagle financed. As a result of these increases and Tou-
lan's failure at that point to make any of the additionally re-
quired purchases, a rift developed. In December of 1967, Nagle
proposed a written stock option agreement which would have
amended the earlier oral agreement as to the amount of money
required of Toulan to purchase the increased partnership inter-
est. Toulan rejected the amendment and, in February of 1968
announced his intention to purchase 50 percent of the business
at the price fixed by the earlier oral agreement. A meeting was
scheduled to consumate the deal, but before the time arrived,
Nagle fired Toulan and rejected Toulan's offer. Toulan comm-
enced an action alleging a breach of contract and seeking one-
half of the profits or one-half of the increased value of the
corporation. A jury returned a verdict in favor of Toulan. Nagle
moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on three
grounds, two of which are pertinent to section 401.110.
Nagel first asserted that the agreement found by the jury
in the special verdict to have been made in 1964 was an oral
agreement upon which recovery could not be had under the
Statute of Frauds. Toulan, while admitting that the agreement
was oral, contended that there was sufficient part performance
of the agreement to take it out of the Statute of Frauds. The
parties conceded that as to the original agreement, the applica-
ble Statute of Frauds was section 121.04 (1963).12 Under an in-
terpretation of that section found in Conway v. Marachowsky,2'
the court concluded that Toulan's efforts in establishing the
dealership were sufficient under the doctrine of part perform-
ance to take the agreement out of the Statute of Frauds.
Nagel similarly contended that the jury answer to the spe-
cial verdict finding that there had been an amendment to the
oral agreement, such amendment allowing Toulan to delay his
initial payment, was also invalid under the Statute of Frauds.
20. Wis. STAT. § 121.04 (1963) provides in relevant part:
121.04 Statute of Frauds. (1) A contract to sell or a sale of any goods or
choses in action of value of fifty dollars or upwards shall not be enforceable by
action unless the buyer shall accept part of the goods or choses in action so
contracted to be sold or sold, and actually receive the same, or give something
in earnest to bind the contract, or in part payment, or unless some note or
memorandum in writing of the contract or sale be signed by the party to be
charged or his agent in that behalf.
21. 262 Wis. 540, 55 N.W.2d 909 (1952).
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The argument as to the amendment was based on a different
provision of the Statute of Frauds, such provision governed by
the Uniform Commercial Code. Although no specific finding as
to the exact date of the amendment was made by the jury, it
was clear that it was subsequent to the effective date of the
Code. Under the Code, no provision for a part performance rule
was enacted "other than where delivery of the security has been
accepted or payment has been made, and then only to the
extent of the delivery or payment.""2 Thus, if the amendment
were governed by the Code, Toulan's rights of enforcement
would have been restricted.
Toulan countered by arguing that under section 401.110,
the 1963 version of the Statute of Frauds, was the applicable
provision governing the oral amendment, just as it had been
the applicable provision governing the initial agreement. The
court agreed, stating that:
We are of the opinion, if an agreement can be terminated,
completed, consummated or enforced under the provisions of
the law applicable at the time of its formation, that it would
be an unreasonable construction of the statute to hold that
the agreement could not be so modified or amended as to
provide for the same. The amendment of the original agree-
ment is subject to the same statutory rules of part perform-
ance applicable to the original agreement.n
II. AGENCY: ToRTIous INTERFERENCE WITH THE PRINCIPAL-
AGENT RELATIONSHIP
It is well established in the law of agency that once the
principal-agent relationship exists, 24 should the agent divert
money intended for the principal's use and benefit to his own
use and benefit, a cause of action arises between principal and
agent for breach of duty.2 St. Francis Savings and Loan Asso-
ciation v. Hearthside Homes21 presented the tangential prob-
22. 67 Wis. 2d at 249, 226 N.W.2d at 489.
23. Id. at 250, 226 N.W.2d at 489.
24. A general statement that one party is an agent of another sufficiently alleges
the existence of an agency relationship. Mercantile Contract Purchase Corp. v. Mel-
nick, 47 Wis. 2d 580, 584, 177 N.W.2d 858, 860 (1970); Herro v. Wisconsin Federal
Surplus Property Development Corp., 42 Wis. 2d 87, 104-05, 166 N.W.2d 433, 442-43
(1969).
25. Degner v. Moncel, 6 Wis. 2d 163, 167, 93 N.W.2d 857 (1959). See also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, §§ 71, 81, 89, 93, 161A, 164 and 171.
26. 65 Wis. 2d 74, 221 N.W.2d 840 (1974).
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lem of whether a third party may also be liable for the agent's
alleged breach of duty.
In Hearthside, the plaintiff savings and loan association
sought a judgment of foreclosure and judicial sale of mortgaged
real estate which secured a residential construction loan to the
bankrupt defendant-borrower. The trustee of the bankrupt
counterclaimed, alleging that from the proceeds of the loan to
the defendant, plaintiff had paid $5,000 to the defendant's real
estate agents who then used that money, intended for construc-
tion purposes, for their own personal use and benefit.
The counterclaim was based on three alternative theories:
(1) negligence, (2) breach of contract, and (3) tortious interfer-
ence with the principal-agent relationship. The trial court sus-
tained plaintiff's demurrer to the counterclaim. The Wisconsin
Supreme Court affirmed the decision, but after modifying a
cause of action for tortious interference with the principal-
agent relationship, remanded the case for amendment of the
pleadings.
The supreme court had no difficulty in determining that the
counterclaim failed to state a cause of action in negligence
because there were no allegations that the payment of the loan
by the plaintiff to the defendant's real estate agents was made
with lack of due care or even that a duty of supervision existed
after disbursement of the money. Similarly, no action for
breach of contract existed, because that cause of action mini-
mally requires that the pleading specifically allege the provi-
sion of the contract at issue and its breach by the defendant.27
However, the counterclaim alleged that the Christiansens,
Hearthside's real estate agents, as fiduciaries, violated a duty
of undivided loyalty owed to Hearthside all to the knowledge,
consent, and approval of plaintiff association. Thus, the impor-
tant issue which remained was whether, under the allegations
of the counterclaim, a third party - the plaintiff-association
- could be liable for the agents' alleged breach of duty in using
money loaned to the principal, Hearthside, and intended for
construction purposes, for their own personal benefit.
The trial court had followed the 1926 ruling in Coakley v.
Degner,'2 and held that no cause of action was stated for tor-
27. Peters v. Peters Auto Sales, Inc., 37 Wis. 2d 346, 350, 155 N.W.2d 85, 87 (1967).
See also 17A C.J.S. Contracts §§ 553, 1029.
28. 191 Wis. 170, 210 N.W. 359 (1926).
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tious interference with the principal-agent relationship. In
Coakley the defendants were not liable for damages for lost
goods when the plaintiffs truck driver in response to defend-
ant's prodding crossed a frozen lake upon the defendant's
assurances that it was safe. The defendants knew that the
driver agent had been instructed by his principal not to drive
on the ice. Intentionally inducing the breach was not enough
to impose liability. The court in Coakley quoted the rule as first
established in Singer S.M. Co. v. Lang29 that:
[o]ne is liable to respond in damages who maliciously in-
duces the agent of another to betray the trust imposed in him
by his principal for the purpose of securing some advantage
to himself at the expense of the principal."
The counterclaim clearly failed to meet the Coakley test be-
cause there was no allegation that the Association acted with
malice or for profit. If anything, the association suffered in that
the alleged misappropriation led, in part, to default upon the
loans.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court overruled Coakley by adopt-
ing section 312 of Restatement (Second) of Agency which pro-
vides: "A person who, without being privileged to do so, inten-
tionally causes or assists an agent to violate a duty to his prin-
cipal is subject to liability to the principal."'3' Adoption of this
section is consistent with the court's prior adoption of section
766 of the Restatement of Torts pertaining to tortious breach
of contractY.3 The court reasoned that while the provisions were
not identical, 33 they pertained to similar conduct,3 and unlike
the law under Coakley neither required a showing that the tort-
feasor acted with malice for personal profit. Applying the law,
the court concluded that the allegations of the counterclaim
29. 186 Wis. 530, 203 N.W. 399 (1925).
30. 191 Wis. at 172, 210 N.W. at 359.
31. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, § 312 (1957).
32. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, § 766 (1939) which reads in part: "[o]ne who, without
a privilege to do so, induces or otherwise purposely causes a third person not to (a)
perform a contract with another, . .. is liable to the other for the harm caused
thereby." See Lorenz v. Dreske, 62 Wis. 2d 273, 214 N.W.2d 73 (1974); Wisconsin
Power and Light Co. v. Gerke, 20 Wis. 2d 181, 121 N.W.2d 912 (1963).
33. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 312 (1957) only requires that the tortious
intermeddler intentionally assist the breach while the RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 766
(1939) requires that he actually cause the breach.
34. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 312 (1957), comment (a) and
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § § 757-812 for the general principles involved.
1976]
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had merit but failed to state with particularity a cause of action
under section 312. The failure was based upon an absence of
detail concerning the real estate agents' use of the money in
breach of their principal-agent duties and concerning the asso-
ciation's assistance in such breach. Thus, the case was re-
manded for repleading.
III. CREDIT AGREEMENT TRANSACTIONS
Repercussions of the State v. J.C. Penney Co.35 decision,
which held that the one and one-half percent monthly service
charge on retail revolving charge accounts constituted usury
under Wisconsin Statutes section 138.05(1)(a) are still being
experienced. In Wiener v. J.C. Penney Co.,38 the court was
faced with the sole issue of whether Wisconsin Statutes section
138.06(7), 31 which prohibits class actions by pre-October 8,
1970 credit sale usury victims, was constitutional.
Wiener presented eight cases consolidated on appeal with
each action presenting one named plaintiff who claimed to sue
for himself individually and for all other Wisconsin citizens
who entered into credit agreements with the defendant. Usury
violations were alleged, with an accounting and penalties for
the six years prior to the bringing of this action being sought.
The defendants demurred to the plaintiffs' right to maintain a
class action, and in June, 1971, the trial court overruled demur-
rers to the class actions for penalties under the usury statute.
Prior to this appeal, two additional subsections were added to
section 138.0611 and as a result of that legislative action, the
35. 45 Wis. 2d 125, 197 N.W.2d 125 (1970). See 54 MARQ. L. REV. 223 (1971) for an
in-depth discussion.
36. 65 Wis. 2d 139, 222 N.W.2d 149 (1974).
37. Wls. STAT. § 138.06(6) and (7) (1971) read as follows:
(6) In connection with a sale of goods or services on credit or any forbear-
ance arising therefrom prior to October 9, 1970, there shall be no allowance of
penalties under this section for violation of s. 138.05, except as to those transac-
tions on which an action has been reduced to a final judgment as of the effective
date of this subsection (1972).
(7) Notwithstanding sub. (6), a seller shall, with respect to a transaction
described in sub. (6), refund or credit the amount of interest, to the extent it
exceeds the rate permitted by s. 138.05(1)(a), which was charged in violation of
s. 138.05 and paid by a buyer since October 8, 1968, upon individual written
demand therefor made on or before March 1, 1973, and signed by such buyer.
A seller who fails within a reasonable time after such demand to make such
refund or credit of excess interest shall be liable in an individual action in the
amount equal to 3 times the amount thereof, together with reasonable attorney's
fees.
38, Wis. STAT. § 138.06(6) and (7); Wis. Laws 1971, ch. 308 (effective May 11,
1972).
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supreme court reversed the order overruling the demurrers and
remanded the case for reconsideration." The supreme court did
not rule on the meaning of the new subsections but noted that
the allowance of penalties was eliminated on its face. Because
the legislature's intent in passing the new subsection could
arguably affect this type of case and because the effect of the
statute on class actions could not have been considered in the
filed briefs, remand was proper. On remand the defendants
interposed amended demurrers alleging that the new statute,
section 138.06(7), deprived the plaintiffs of the right to main-
tain a class action. The demurrers were sustained, and the
issue of the constitutionality of section 138.06(7) was framed.
Plaintiffs acknowledged that section 138.06(7) created two
changes in the law with respect to persons who had charged
usurious interest rates on transactions prior to October 8, 1970:
(1) the measure of damages was changed to eliminate penal-
ties, and (2) class actions were forbidden. However, they
claimed that section 138.06(7) was unconstitutional as a denial
of equal protection of the laws in violation of the fourteenth
amendment to the United States Constitution" and article I,
section 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution.41 In addition they
argued that law denied a remedy for a wrong in violation of
article I, section 9 of the Wisconsin Constitution. 2 The basis
for the violation of equal protection was the statute's effect in
distinguishing the pre-Penney group in denying them the right
to bring class actions available to all others having legal claims
of various kinds, including post-Penny usury victims.
In affirming the trial court decision sustaining the demur-
39. Wiener v. J.C. Penney Co., 55 Wis. 2d 61, 197 N.W.2d 756 (1972).
40. The fourteenth amendment to the U.S. CONST. provides in part:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; -nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
41. ART. I. § 1, of the WISCONSIN CONSTTUTmON provides:
All men are born equally free and independent, and have certain inherent rights;
among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness; to secure these rights,
governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the
consent of the governed.
42. ART. I, § 9, of the WISCONSIN CONSTITUTION provides:
Every person is entitled to a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries, or wrong
which he may receive in his person, property, or character; he ought to obtain
justice freely, and without being obliged to purchase it, completely and without
denial, promptly and without delay, conformably to the laws.
1976]
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rers to the class actions, the supreme court established the
standard of review for equal protection claims based on the
following principles:
(1) Only if a challenger can show that the classification
is arbitrary and has no reasonable purpose or relationship to
the facts or a justifiable and proper state policy will a legisla-
tive classification fall on the grounds of a denial of equal
protection.43
(2) [T]he classification made by the legislature is pre-
sumed to be valid unless the court can say that no state of
facts can reasonably be conceived that would sustain it."
(3) [Bjefore a statute will be held unconstitutional for
violating these standards, the attacker must meet a very
heavy burden of proof and persuasion.45
Additionally the court listed five other standards:
(1) All classifications must be based upon substantial dis-
tinction which make one class really different from another.
(2) The classifications adopted must be germane to the pur-
pose of the law.
(3) The classifications must not be based upon existing cir-
cumstances only. They must not be so constituted as to pre-
clude additions to the numbers included within a class.
(4) To whatever class a law may apply, it must apply
equally to each member thereof.
(5) The characteristics of each class should be so far differ-
ent from those of other classes as to reasonably suggest at
least the propriety, having regard to the public good, of sub-
stantially different legislation.46
43. 65 Wis. 2d at 146, 222 N.W.2d at 153, quoting Simanco, Inc. v. Dept. of Reve-
nue, 57 Wis. 2d 47, 57, 203 N.W.2d 648, 653 (1973).
44. Id. at 147, 222 N.W.2d at 153, quoting Country Motors v. Friendly Finance
Corp. 13 Wis. 2d 475, 485, 109 N.W.2d 137, 142 (1961). For holdings that legislation
regulating economic and fiscal affairs enjoys a presumption of constitutionality see
Simanco, Inc. v. Dept. of Revenue, 57 Wis. 2d 47, 203 N.W.2d 648 (1973). Dandridge
v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970); Vanden Broek v. Reitz, 53 Wis. 2d 87, 191 N.W.2d
913 (1971).
For holdings that classifications in usury statutes have been specifically accorded
a presumption of constitutionality see Country Motors v. Friendly Finance Corp., 13
Wis. 2d 475, 485, 109 N.W.2d 137, 142 (1961), quoting State v. Neveau, 237 Wis. 85,
99, 294 N.W. 796, 803 (1941).
45. 65 Wis. 2d at 147, 222 N.W. 2d at 153.
46. Id., citing State ex rel. LaFollette v. Reuter, 36 Wis. 2d 96, 111, 153 N.W.2d
49, 55 (1967) states: "[To declare an act of the legislature as to a classification
violative of the equal protection clause, it is first necessary to prove that the legislature
has abused its discretion beyond a reasonable doubt."
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Applying these principles, the court reasoned that the stat-
ute could reasonably serve a legitimate public purpose by pro-
tecting the state economy, since the severity of penalty claims
under the usury statute could be devastating to defendants
both in terms of the ultimate judgment and the costs of litiga-
tion. The court premised this conclusion upon an examination
of the history of section 138.06(7). It noted that the statute was
passed at a special meeting of the legislature after the governor
warned that the 1970 Penney decision exposed retailers across
the state to potentially bankrupting liability from hundreds of
thousands of penalty claims under the usury laws.47
The court found further support for its position from the
special circumstances surrounding the passage of the bill which
revealed a rational justification for the difference in treatment
between usury claims and all other claims. These special cir-
cumstances are based on the fact that prior to the 1970 Penney
decision the Wisconsin courts had never ruled on the validity
of a revolving charge plan under the usury laws. The court
ruled that under these circumstances the legislature might
have reasonably concluded that pre-Penney retailers had acted
in good faith and therefore should not be subject to severe
penalties.
Adopting a parallel analysis the court found a rational justi-
fication for treating pre-Penney and post-Penney usury victims
differently. It reasoned that after the Penney decision was an-
nounced, all retailers in the state were effectively put on notice
that the usury laws applied to revolving charge accounts and
that any further violations could not be considered in good
faith. The court finally noted that reasonable classifications
based on time have frequently been upheld in Wisconsin.48
The court's second major ruling was that section 138.06(7)
was not a denial of a remedy for wrongs contrary to article I,
section 9, of the Wisconsin Constitution. Section 138.06(7) pro-
47. Id. at 148, 222 N.W.2d at 154, quoting Journal of the Senate (Special Session,
1972), April 19, 1972, pp. 9, 10. The governor said in part: "There could be literally
hundreds of small retailers in our state who are threatened with potential bankruptcy
unless the legislature intervenes."
48. Jelinski v. Eggars, 34 Wis. 2d 85, 148 N.W.2d 750 (1967) (zoning ordinance
constitutional which permits prior existing but prohibits future nonconforming uses);
Estate of Bloomer, 2 Wis. 2d 623, 87 N.W.2d 531 (1958) (debtor not denied equal
protection where statute of limitations protects him from one kind of claim but not
another); Werlein v. Milwaukee Electric Ry. & Transport Co., 267 Wis. 392, 66 N.W.2d
185 (1954) (statutory classifications based upon time are generally recognized as valid).
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vides that if upon written individual demand the retailer re-
fuses to refund the excess, the claimant may sue for triple the
amount plus reasonable attorney's fees. While it may not pro-
vide the exact remedy which the plaintiffs desired, it was a
"certain remedy," conforming to the laws, and gave plaintiffs
their "day in court" as required by the constitution.49 The
plaintiffs' complaint that the new statutory procedure was in-
adequate was not rejected since there was no evidence pre-
sented that plaintiffs availed themselves of this procedure.
While the rule in Wiener is not surprising in cohtinuing the
trend of limiting class actions generally or in supporting gov-
ernment policy which promotes and protects the interests of
the state economy, it does raise some questions. First, in the
governor's message urging passage of the bill,5 he stated that
literally hundreds of small retailers would be threatened with
potential bankruptcy unless legislative intervention occurred.
This was based on a study of thirty-two stores in twenty Wis-
consin cities showing that each would face bankruptcy should
the full penalty be exacted. Major points which might be raised
relating to this foundation study are: (1) is it the small retail
business which commonly uses retail charge accounts or is it a
favored device of large retail outlets, and (2) what is the likeli-
hood of any court exacting the full penalty in every case.
Secondly, the court utilized a good faith argument which is
extremely subjective. The court stated that the parties were
acting in good faith because they conformed to the laws as they
existed, and when the laws change, the parties will then be put
on notice that the same actions could not thereafter be in good
faith. While this theory satisfies a good faith test in a narrow
sense, it might be regarded differently if it were examined from
the perspective of a large retailer who is attempting to keep his
interest rates as high as possible for as long as possible through
litigation intended only to prolong a favorable status quo.
While the decision is founded on a principle of protecting the
state economy, it seems an unusual kind of justice which is
accomplished by protecting retail stores which have profited at
the expense of Wisconsin citizens who were charged usurious
rates of interest.
On the other hand, "usurious rates of interest" are strictly
49. See Metzger v. Department of Taxation, 35 Wis. 2d 119, 150 N.W.2d 431 (1967).
50. Journal of the Senate (Special Session, 1972), supra note 7.
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defined by statute: today's usury is yesterday's acceptable,
legal way of conducting business.
JOHN D. CENTER
CRIMINAL JUSTICE
An examination of the recent term of the Wisconsin Su-
preme Court, in the criminal justice field, verifies an observa-
tion made in this publication a year ago, that the court's treat-
ment of defendant's rights had approached a degree of stabil-
ity, and that the criminal justice system would settle into a
temporary period of applications of those decisions without
significant change in the court's characterization of the rights
themselves.' In addition, the court has been more preoccupied
with pre-conviction remedies than with post-conviction reme-
dies. This shift is illustrated by a reduction in the number of
cases construing the law of search and seizure, an area which
has been a hot bed of activity in recent years. Despite this
relative quietude, cases in the criminal justice field continue to
constitute the vast majority of the court's written decisions and
remains an ever changing area of the law.
I. PRE-TRIAL CONSIDERATIONS
Perhaps one of the most confusing and troublesome contro-
versies in the law of search and seizure concerns the propriety
of inventory searches of vehicles coming into the custody of the
police after the driver has been arrested. In State v.
McDougal,2 the court addressed the obvious confusion existing
in the law and arrived at a determinative decision.
The fact situation of McDougal was fairly typical: The de-
fendant was stopped for a traffic violation, and a succession of
extenuating circumstances resulted in his being taken to the
1. Term of Court, Criminal Justice, 58 Marq. L. Rev. 313, 317 (1975):
It appears that Mabra and Robinson are in part attempts to eliminate litiga-
tion on searches and seizures. The attempt may prove to be unsuccessful, be-
cause a possible result of the decisions will be merely to shift litigation to related
areas of the criminal law. Now exposed to more search opportunities, defendants
may more often and more vigorously dispute "probable cause" for their investi-
gatory stopping and arrests. An arrest may be challenged as pretextual for the
search, and disputes may arise as to the timeliness of a search vis-a-vis its
justifying arrest. [citations omitted].
2. 68 Wis. 2d 399, 228 N.W.2d 671 (1975).
